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Abstract
Background: Improving public accountability is currently high on the global agenda. At the same time, the
organisation of health services in low- and middle-income countries is taking place in fragmented institutional
landscapes. State and non-state actors are involved in increasingly complex governance arrangements. This often
leads to coordination problems, confusion of roles and responsibilities and possibly accountability gaps. This study
aimed at assessing the governance arrangements and the accountability practices of key health actors at the level
of a Ghanaian health district with the aim to understand how far public accountability is achieved.
Methods: We adopted the case study design as it allows for in-depth analysis of the governance arrangements
and accountability relations between actors, their formal policies and actual accountability practices towards the
public and towards stakeholders. Data were collected at a rural health district using in-depth interviews, observation
and document review. In the analysis, we used a four-step sequence: identification of the key actors and their
relationships, description of the multi-level governance arrangements, identification of the actual accountability
relations and practices between all actors and finally appraisal of the public accountability practices, which we
define as those practices that ensure direct accountability towards the public.
Results: In this rural health district with few (international) non-governmental organisations and private sector
providers, accountability linkages towards management and partners in health programmes were found to be
strong. Direct accountability towards the public, however, was woefully underdeveloped. This study shows that in
settings where there is a small number of actors involved in organising health care, and where the state actors are
underfunded, the intense interaction can lead to a web of relations that favours collaboration between partners in
health service delivery, but fails public accountability.
Conclusions: It is clear that new formal channels need to be created by all actors involved in health service
delivery to address the demand of the public for accountability. If the public does not find an adequate response
to its genuine concerns, distrust between communities and service users on one hand, and providers, international
non-governmental organisations and District Health Management Teams on the other is likely to increase to the
detriment of all parties’ interests.
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Background
The organisation and delivery of health services in low-
and middle-income countries (LMIC) is taking place in
a fragmented institutional landscape: not only has the
number of state and non-state actors multiplied, these
actors are also involved in increasingly complex multi-
level governance arrangements [1, 2]. Such situations
lead to shared responsibilities for health service delivery
and can lead to public accountability gaps if there is
confusion regarding who carries the final responsibility
for the delivery of services [3]. We define public ac-
countability practices as those that contribute to ensur-
ing direct accountability towards the public, such as
creating complaint boxes, organising community consul-
tations, etc.
In LMIC, health system governance is marked by
power sharing between a network of government actors,
international non-governmental organisations and the
country’s development partners. National and inter-
national non-governmental organisations claim to repre-
sent the voice of the people [4]. In short, a pluralistic
health system with INGOs involved in service delivery
represents a complex web of obligations between all ac-
tors involved [5–7].
Our hypothesis is that the proliferation of actors in the
health system often gives rise to coordination problems
and confusion of roles and responsibilities at the level of
the local health system (LHS). Even if having multiple ac-
tors in a local health may contribute to its resilience, it
also may possibly lead to gaps in public accountability be-
cause of power differentials. A key source of ambiguity lies
in the fact that INGOs have to be accountable to multiple
actors: INGOs need to balance accountability to the do-
nors with accountability to service users [5, 8, 9]. INGO
accountability becomes even more complex in a situation
of multi-level governance, where political authority is dis-
tributed between the global, national, regional and local
levels. The hierarchy of power between these levels is
likely to be an important factor in the process of balancing
multiple streams of accountabilities [6, 10].
In many LMIC, the District Health Management Team
(DHMT) often does not possess adequate decision space
nor the capacity to effectively negotiate with INGOs.
Furthermore, the access to information for donors,
DHMTs and beneficiaries may be asymmetric. Finally,
local health authorities often experience strong external
pressures, since many actors desire rapid results within
short time frames. If demands for accountability point to
different directions, the question remains as to whose
demands should be prioritised [3]. Somehow surpris-
ingly, the way in which partnerships between INGOs
and district health management teams at the level of
local health systems can contribute to enhanced public
accountability is a neglected topic [11]. There are,
indeed, remarkably few studies on actual accountability
practices in local health systems in LMIC.
In Ghana, the strong presence of INGOs and NGOs
delivering health services makes for a landscape of ser-
vice provision that is interestingly complex and in which
accountability is a key issue. Like most health systems,
the Ghanaian health system is pluralistic and health care
is delivered both through public services and a growing
private sector [12]. A major reform was introduced in
the 1990s, through which the Ministry of Health was to
be responsible for policy development and the Ghana
Health Service for implementation [13]. The health sec-
tor is marked by ongoing decentralisation efforts, with
current emphasis on delegation and de-concentration
(see [14] for definitions),1 and a progressing political and
administrative decentralisation [15]. The National
Health Insurance Scheme, introduced in 2003 is a major
game changer, having the potential of not only reducing
financial barriers to care, but also of improving quality
of care, on the condition that it increases consumer
choice and power [16]. Finally, the discovery of oil and
the shift to Lower Middle Income Country status has led
to reduced donor funding [17, 18]. All this provided ex-
cellent opportunities to carry out case studies and de-
velop theory on public accountability at the level of
health districts.
In this paper, we present the findings of a case study
that aimed at assessing the governance arrangements
and the accountability practices of key health actors at
the level of a Ghanaian health district, with specific at-
tention for (inter)national NGOs, and assessing in how
far public accountability is achieved. This case study is
part of a PhD study on the interactions between INGOs
and District Health Management Teams and the effect
on public accountability. The PhD adopted a realist
evaluation approach. The initial programme theory was
elicited through a meta-narrative review of the concept
of accountability [19] and integrates accountability and
governance concepts (Table 1).
Methods
Study design
As mentioned above, the PhD study adopted the realist
evaluation approach, which is method-neutral: the study
design needs to enable testing of the programme theory
[20]. Understanding the conditions for enhanced public
accountability entails an in-depth analysis of the mecha-
nisms underlying the interactions and processes that can
be observed: the governance arrangements and account-
ability linkages between actors in the health system at
different levels, formal policies and actual accountability
practices of actors involved, and actors’ perceptions of
these. The case study design fits this bill, because it al-
lows for the study of relationships and roles and the
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detailed mapping of all contextual factors and mecha-
nisms that inform actors’ interactions [21–23]. Further-
more, the case study design has a potential for theory
building [24] and is thus eminently compatible with the
realist approach.
Definitions
We briefly introduce a few key terms and their defin-
ition. We use the definition of “governance” of political
scientist Zürn: “the sum of regulations, including policies,
programs and decisions to remedy via a collective course
of action, (2) the actors and processes that make up the
collective course of action and (3) structures, including
the comparatively stable institutional, socio-economic
and ideational parameters, as well as the historically
entrenched actor constellations that shape policy pro-
cesses in a particular context.” [25] Under multi-level
governance, we understand those institutional arrange-
ments in which authority is distributed over local, na-
tional and supranational levels [26], p.104).
Public accountability is a term that has different mean-
ings according to discipline [19]. We use an adapted ver-
sion of Mulgan’s definition of public accountability [27]:
“(…) the obligation of public institutions and private not-
for-profit organisations involved in health service delivery
to answer questions regarding both decisions and actions
to the public which is the source of their mandate, au-
thority and legitimacy.” [27].
Accountability to the public, coined by some authors as
“downward” accountability, is only one category of account-
ability relationships among many in a health system [28].
We could classify the other accountability relationships in
the health system as horizontal, vertical and partnership
accountability, reflecting hierarchical, collaborative and
networked modes of governance respectively [29, 30]. Hori-
zontal accountability relationships are accountability rela-
tionships between autonomous actors at the same (policy)
level, such as between a district health management team
and a NGO. Vertical accountability relationships are those
relationships between two public institutions at a different
level, e.g. the district health management team is
accountable for its performance to the provincial health
management team. Partnership accountability refers to the
accountability between state and non-state actors in public-
private partnerships, with the partnership ranging from
loose collaboration to contractual arrangements [29–31].
Description of the case
The case in this study is defined as the set of the interac-
tions of (and between) SRH INGOs and the District
Health Management Team in the ‘globalised’ decision
space for SRH service delivery in the local health system.
In effect, the decision space in the local health system
consists of the network of local, national and supra-
national actors involved in the organisation, management
and delivery of health services. The scope of analysis is
thus extended from a traditional case study, focusing on
the interactions between actors at one level, to a case
study of their interactions against the background of the
governance arrangements and accountability practices of
actors at the national and supra-national level [32].
Case selection
In line with the realist evaluation approach to case selec-
tion, the cases were purposely chosen: cases should
allow testing of the programme theory (PT) and are se-
lected because they provide a variation of one or more
PT elements [20, 33]. In this study, we selected two
cases to allow for sufficient depth and rich data at this
stage of exploration: an urban and a rural local health
system, with a different density of SRH INGOs involved
in service delivery or support to service delivery. For the
case study we report on in this paper, we collected data
at a rural health district located in the south of Ghana
where two INGOs were active in SRH service delivery.
Additional data were collected at regional, national level
and supra-national level.
The site
The local health system under study is situated in a rural
district, located near a major river. It has a population of
around 90,000 inhabitants spread over more than 350
Table 1 The initial programme theory
A pluralistic health system harbours a web of accountability relationships between actors who combine the roles of account-holder and accountor,
having both accountability entitlements and obligations.
Public accountability is actualised when actors are answerable to the public and remedial action is undertaken. Public accountability requires both
answerability and enforceability in order to be actualised. The answerability or the capability of the DHMT, of INGOs and partnerships to inform,
evaluate and report in an open manner requires transparency and clarity on whom they represent and deliver services to. Answerability is actualised
through practices grounded in compliance and persuasion.
Enforceability is grounded in the capability of the public to demand accountability on the one hand and in meta-governance, i.e. the function,
exercised by a state actor(s), of regulating, monitoring and sanctioning on the public’s behalf, on the other hand.
Accountability practices operate along four dimensions (social, political, organisational and the provider dimension). Each dimension has specific
bundles of strategies, practices, relationships and outcomes. Accountability is embedded in vertical, horizontal and partnership governance
arrangements.
Multi-level governance arrangements weaken public accountability when there is confusion over roles and responsibilities between governing actors.
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villages. Most people in the district are poor. The main
economic activities are subsistence farming, fishing and
food hawking. There are over 25 NGOs officially regis-
tered at the District Social Affairs Office, 17 of which
are currently active. Of the 25 NGOs, two are Inter-
national NGOs. The other NGOs are dormant because
of lack of funding [34]. The health district consists of six
sub-districts covered by 21 health facilities. This com-
prises one GHS district hospital, one faith-based hos-
pital, four Ghana Health Service (GHS) first line health
facilities, 13 functional Community-based Health Plan-
ning and Services (CHPS) zones, one youth centre with
a family planning clinic, one private maternity home and
one private first line health facility.
Data collection
We used in-depth interviews, observations, and docu-
ment review to collect data. We developed semi-
structured interview topic guides for different types of
respondents and these were pre-tested with SRH INGO
representatives and GHS managers outside the study
site. Interviewees were purposely sampled, as the object-
ive was to collect data on perceptions of different cat-
egories of actors (e.g. DHMT, INGO, District Assembly,
community leaders, etc.) operating at different levels
(e.g. INGO headquarters, INGO national office, district
representation of the INGO). We conducted 23 in-depth
interviews and a further 13 informal discussions with re-
source persons. The study was explained in detail to all
interviewees, and informed consent obtained in all cases.
The duration of the interviews ranged from 45 min to
two hours. Interviews were recorded when allowed by
the interviewee. The recorded interviews were tran-
scribed by an experienced Ghanaian transcriber, who
was bound by a confidentiality agreement.
As formal DHMT-(I)NGO meetings were not held
regularly during our stay, we used any opportunity that
arose during the visits. For instance, we attended a half-
day regional forum of the Ghana Coalition of NGOs in
Health, where GHS representatives were invited to speak
and a meeting between a District Chief Executive and a
District Director of Health Services. Additional oppor-
tunities for observation were provided during our visits
to health facilities in the district.
Documents reviewed include project descriptions of
SRH INGO programmes, GHS annual reports and GHS
half-year performance reviews at different levels, GHS
policies, guidelines and tools, reports from the district
administration, policy reviews from donors and INGOs,
and articles in the press.
Data analysis
We started with drafting of a thick description of the
case, incorporating data from interviews, observations
and document reviews. For the analysis, we followed a
sequence of 4 steps. In a first step, we described the dis-
tal context in terms of the district setting, the local
health system and its health service organisation, the key
actors active in the local health system, the main health
concerns and the performance in sexual and reproduct-
ive health service delivery.
Secondly, we analysed the multi-level governance ar-
rangements in the local health system that affect the
functioning of the District Health Management Team,
the SRH INGOs and the partnerships in the local health
system. These were analysed using the categories of ver-
tical, horizontal and partnership arrangements, their
purpose and main processes.
In a third step, the actual accountability relations and
practices were identified and assessed. Actual account-
ability practices were compared with formal (published)
policies, strategies and processes. More specifically, this
included:
 A description of the account-holder and accountor
roles of the DHMT, SRH INGOs and the
partnerships.
 The identification of the main accountability
linkages of each actor and assessment of their
strengths: A strong relationship has intense or
frequent activity and/or involves multiple processes
and instruments; A relationship of moderate
strength is characterized by moderate or
intermittent activity and/or few processes; A weak
relationship has no or virtually no activities.
 The categorisation of actual accountability practices:
reporting, monitoring and evaluation, participatory
decision-making, community consultation,
supervision.
 The analysis of the drivers of these practices.
Lastly, we appraised the public accountability practices
of the DHMT, the SRH INGOs and the partnerships, fo-
cusing o, the following questions:
 What are the actual public accountability practices
and in which dimension of accountability are they
nested (the social, political, organisational or
provider dimension?
 To which degree are the practices of the actors
ensuring public accountability?
For each step, we designed data collection forms and
tools that were inspired by or adapted from existing
tools identified during the meta-narrative review.
We used NVIVO 10 software for qualitative data man-
agement and analysis. Techniques proposed by Miles
and Huberman [35], such as familiarization with data,
Van Belle and Mayhew BMC Health Services Research  (2016) 16:568 Page 4 of 14
coding and categorizing, pattern-seeking within cases,
displaying of findings through concept charts and maps
of governance and accountability arrangements were
used during the analytical process.
Results
In this section, we present the key actors in the local
health system, the governance arrangements, and the ac-
tual accountability relations and practices. We end with
an appraisal of the public accountability of the DHMT,
the SRH INGOs and the partnerships.
The key actors in the local health system
The District Health Management Team (DHMT) has
the formal mandate to oversee all health activities in the
district. At its heart is the core management team, in
charge of the daily management and comprising of the
District Director of Health Services, the administrator,
the accountant, the Deputy Director of Nursing Services
and the disease control officer/CHPS coordinator (Mem-
ber DHMT, interview 41). The district has a population
of around 90.000 inhabitants, spread around rural vil-
lages. The health district consists of six sub-districts cov-
ered by 21 public, private and private not for profit
health facilities. The Ghana Health Service has one dis-
trict hospital and four first-line health facilities with 13
community health zones, each with a compound (CHPS
compound). Eight compounds provide curative care.
The burden of disease consists mainly of malaria, schis-
tosomiasis and non-communicable diseases. The district
is a low performer in the delivery of SRH services com-
pared to other districts in the region, primarily due to a
shortage of midwives and difficult access during the
rainy season. The DHMT annual report of 2012 notes a
skilled delivery rate of 63.8 % and a low family planning
acceptor rate of 11 %. The District Assembly will be
sponsoring midwives to be assigned to the district (37).
The DHMT is funded through the Ministry of Health
(MOH) allocations, which are both unpredictably dis-
bursed and insufficient to cover for all the DHMT’s ac-
tivities. Two to five % of its budget is provided by the
District Assembly, which in addition sponsors the train-
ing of health providers. To make up for the deficit, the
DHMT takes 10 % of the internally generated funds
(IGF) of the health centres. The latter consists of the
fees patients pay for services and reimbursements by the
National Health Insurance Scheme.
The principal actors active in curative health service
delivery are the Ghana Health Service and a Catholic
hospital. The latter provides services comparable to a
typical district hospital and its caseload equals that of
the District Hospital. There is only one private first line
health facility and one private maternity home.
The District Assembly (DA) counts 60 members and
its district administration has 45 staff, who are civil ser-
vants. The District Assembly together with the District
Chief Executive represent the local government level,
which is responsible for overall development planning
[36]. The District Assembly take an active interest in
health issues. The District Assembly supports the train-
ing of health personnel (midwives) and invests in health
infrastructure, such as the construction of Community-
based Health Planning and Services compounds,
community-based health posts staffed by trained mid-
wives [37]. The District Director of Health Services at-
tends the Social Affairs committee and is the secretary
of the Health Sub-Committee (members District Assem-
bly, interviews 50 & 51).
There are two INGOs and 1 NGO that provide or sup-
port sexual and reproductive health services. INGO 1
has been active in the district since 2000. It runs a youth
recreation centre with a family planning clinic. It offers
SRH counselling and services to adolescents and trains
peer educators in SRH counselling. Its donor funding
has dwindled over the last years.
INGO 2 started a four-year maternal and child health
programme in 2011, supporting behaviour change and
community participation, and improvement of maternal,
neonatal and child health services. This intervention is
funded by an international donor and by a Northern
partner organisation. It is implemented through the
GHS with the support of NGO 1, a local NGO
contracted to do the community-based work [38]
(employees INGO, interview 26, 27).
NGO 1 has been active in the region since 2011. It was
involved in the community-based work on schistosomiasis
control of INGO 2. Now, within the above-described
programme of INGO 2, it supports the community health
nurses at the CHPS compounds through sensitisation ac-
tivities in the community, e.g. the organisation of maternal
health support groups. Besides this project, NGO 1 pro-
vides legal assistance to women and children victim of do-
mestic violence. The latter is not externally funded
(employees NGO, interviews 32 & 62).
The governance arrangements in the local health system
We found that the internal governance arrangements of
the District Health Management Team, the INGOs and
NGO 1 are mainly hierarchical in nature. The interac-
tions between these actors are ruled by horizontal and
partnership governance arrangements.
Within the Ghana Health Service, strategic planning for
the district is conducted every five years, combined
with an annual review [39]. The district planning
process is essentially a top-down process, with some
bottom-up priority setting. According to the guide-
lines, the providers of the first-line facilities and of
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the CHPS compound should be involved in the plan-
ning process. The plan is consolidated by the District
Health Management Team and sent for approval to
the Regional Health Management Team, which in
turn sends it to the national headquarters. The na-
tional level releases funding for the district on the
basis of an annual performance review (member
DHMT, interview 41). Although this planning cycle
combines a top-down with a bottom-up process, we
found that the actual mode of governance between
the DHMT and the first line facilities is mainly hier-
archical, based on reviewing performance against mu-
tually agreed targets. The mode of governance
between the DHMT and the Regional Health Direct-
orate is also hierarchical: the DHMT reports the util-
isation of resources and the district’s performance to
the Regional Directorate, which uses the half-yearly
and annual performance report, the district peer re-
views and the half-yearly performance review meet-
ings as tools to ‘control’ the districts. While the latter
performance reviews are essentially based on ‘name
and shame’, there is some space for learning – health
staff exchange and discuss their experiences (Member
DHMT, interview 41; member DHMT, interview 68;
provider, interview 39).
Also the INGOs and NGO 1 have internal vertical
governance arrangements. They are all part of a national
or international NGO structure, and their hierarchical
management structures are reinforced by internal
reporting procedures. INGO 2, for instance, has a local
office that reports to the regional office, which in turn
reports to the national office of the NGO. Activities can
be modified during the course of programme implemen-
tation, but objectives and main strategies are fixed by
the national office (Member INGO, interview 26).
The analysis showed there are several horizontal govern-
ance arrangements centred on the DHMT and the SRH
INGOs. The District Health Management Team, the Dis-
trict Assembly, the district administration and the Mem-
ber of Parliament are part of a first horizontal governance
arrangement. The ongoing public sector decentralisation
and de-concentration process and the gradual move to-
wards a further integration of territorial and sector plan-
ning are the main drivers of this horizontal arrangement.
Participating in this arrangement, the District Assembly is
perceived by a number of respondents as playing a key
role in the DHMT strategic planning (member DHMT,
interview 41). The district health plan and budget are not
only sent upwards to the regional GHS level, but also to
the DA, which provides small scale funding for the imple-
mentation of health programmes (e.g. the Anti Retroviral
Treatment programme) and for the DHMT’s administra-
tion, staff training and infrastructure. Respondents from
the DHMT and the district administration indicate that
this horizontal arrangement with the DA requires skilful
negotiation of the District Director of Health Services,
who needs to advocate her/his case against other sector’s
priorities (Member District Assembly, interview 50; mem-
ber DHMT, interview 41).
There is also a governance arrangement between the
DHMT and the District Hospital that is mainly horizon-
tal, although the Hospital operates virtually independ-
ently from the DHMT. The District Hospital is a
separate Budget and Management Centre and receives
as such its GHS resources directly and is supported by
the regional level in its strategic planning [40].
Also the governance arrangement between the DHMT
and the CHPS committees is mainly horizontal and thus
non-hierarchical, as the members of the CHPS commit-
tee are volunteers, including local opinion leaders,
chiefs, elders, and assemblymen. The CHPS committees
operate on a purely collaborative basis, and the import-
ance of winning the community’s trust is well under-
stood by the providers at the first line facilities. Our
analysis shows that the latter often deplore the lack of
community engagement in the maintenance of CHPS
compounds and health facilities (Member of DHMT,
interview 41). It seems that both the members of the
DHMT and the providers perceive the relationship with
the community as instrumental, i.e. as a source of sup-
port and not necessarily as a relationship in which ac-
countability is due in its own right.
The arrangements that exist between the DHMT, NGO
1 and the INGOs is mainly horizontal with some vertical
elements. The District Health Management Team is sup-
posed to oversee and control all health activities of the
(I)NGOs, but at the same time it collaborates with these
organisations, which it considers as partners. Indeed, the
DHMT actively seeks to create networks among all health
actors. In its annual reports, it explicitly recognises the
need for a “friendly collaboration network”, not only with
the District Assembly and the communities, but also with
the INGO/NGOs. In practice, the Community Health Of-
ficer of the DHMT works closely with NGO 1, whereby,
for example, the NGO workers take over some of the
health promotion tasks of the Community Health Officer
and accompany the community members to the health fa-
cility (Member of DHMT, interview 41).
It appears from the interviews that both the District
Health Management Team and the District Assembly
have a high regard for INGOs and that they consider
them as equal partners. INGOs are perceived as sharing
the Ghana Health Service values - helping the staff to
deliver on the GHS mandate through their resources
and technical expertise. In addition, INGOs are much
welcomed as they bring in additional resources for the
DHMT (Member DHMT, interview 41). On the other
hand, local NGOs are considered as less professional
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and requiring close supervision (Member DHMT, inter-
view 41).
Finally, we found that in this district, there are two
partnerships, which can be described as collaborations
with specific goals, uniting actors who each lack the
resources to reach these shared goals by themselves.
Partnership 1 involves INGO 1 and the District
Hospital. When the donor funding for the provision
of adolescent sexual and reproductive health services
by INGO 1 was cut, the director of the District Hos-
pital agreed to support the youth recreation centre
and the partners signed a memorandum of under-
standing (MoU) to this effect.
The second Partnership includes INGO 2, the
DHMT, NGO 1 and the District Assembly. It was set
up with the objective of improving maternal, neonatal
and child health. A first Memorandum of Under-
standing was signed by INGO 2 and the District As-
sembly at district level, stipulating that the DA would
provide small-scale logistical support. A second MoU
was concluded between INGO 2 and the GHS at na-
tional, regional and district level. In a third step,
INGO 2 subcontracted the community-based work to
NGO 1. This partnership expects that the community
co-manages the intervention and contributes through
the community representatives in the Unit Commit-
tees, the CHPS committee members and the volun-
teer community mobilisers (Employee INGO,
interview 26) [38]. Our analysis shows that within this
partnership, the DHMT and the GHS service pro-
viders have limited margins of freedom. They can ne-
gotiate, within certain limits, changes in operational
strategies with INGO 2, but the overall objectives are
set by INGO 2’s national office and headquarters and
are non-negotiable. For the DHMT, the main benefit
of entering in this partnership is the extra funding
that the Partnership provides (Member DHMT, inter-
view 36).
The accountability practices of the key actors
Accountability relations include accountor and account-
holder roles. Most health actors typically combine these
roles.
The District Health Management Team is accountor
to the Regional Health Management Team, the District
Assembly and the District Chief Executive (Fig. 1). The
accountability practices of the DHMT consist of the fol-
lowing processes and instruments:
 The DHMT reports on a six-monthly basis to the
Regional Health Management Team and participates
in the regional performance reviews.
 The DHMT reports to the District Assembly on
health performance.
 The District Director of Health Services informs the
Health Sub-Committee of the District Assembly,
which is part of the Social Affairs Committee, on
health issues, activities and performance.
The DHMT holds various actors to account through
different practices (Fig. 2):
 Supervision and monitoring of providers in the
CHPS compounds and health facilities.
 Reporting by community health nurses and nurses
on performance of CHPS compounds and health
facilities.
 Monthly performance peer reviews for providers.
 Participation in the hospital management meetings
and hospital peer reviews (while inversely, the
District Hospital Team participates in the District
Health Management Team management meetings
and performance reviews).
 Registration and reporting of (I)NGOs to the
District Health Management Team and inviting the
INGOs to present their activities and performance
in the DHMT performance reviews.
INGO 1 and 2 are accountable to different actors,
enacted mainly through reporting (Fig. 3). The INGOs
report to:
 their respective INGO national office on resources,
activities and results
 the District Health Management Team on results
 the District Assembly on results.
Partnership 1, which brings together the District
Hospital and INGO 1 around the youth recreation
centre with the family planning clinic, reports to the
national office of INGO 1 on activities and results.
The Partnership also reports to the District Hospital
(employee INGO, interview 31; employee INGO,
interview 33). Finally, Partnership 1 reports to the
DHMT.
Partnership 2, including INGO 2, the DHMT, NGO 1
and the District Assembly, reports to the regional and
the national office of INGO 2 on activities and results.
The Partnership reports also to the DHMT. The Part-
nership finally reports to the District Assembly (Fig. 4).
From the analysis, it emerges that the strong account-
ability relationships and practices in LHS 1 are based on
either vertical governance arrangements where an actor
has to account to the hierarchy on results, or horizontal
governance arrangements and partnerships where an
actor has to account for the resources provided by an-
other actor. Both are expressed in effective formal, regu-
lar reporting and review meetings.
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Fig. 1 The District Health Management Team of LHS 1 as accountor
Fig. 2 The District Health Management Team of LHS 1 as account-holder
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We found some accountability relationships to be mod-
erately strong. We found these to occur in horizontal and
partnership governance arrangements without resource
exchange. In these cases, the District Health Management
Team and the District Assembly are merely informed by
the INGOs and the partnerships on the basis of their re-
spective formal mandates: the DHMT is informed as over-
seer of health activities and the DA is informed because of
its role as the state actor responsible for aligning NGO ac-
tivities with local development priorities.
Fig. 3 The SRH INGOs of LHS 1 as accountors
Fig. 4 Partnerships in LHS 1 as accountors
Van Belle and Mayhew BMC Health Services Research  (2016) 16:568 Page 9 of 14
We also found that accountability is weak when there
is a power differential and/or lack of capacity. The Dis-
trict Social Welfare Office, for instance, has a clear
mandate of regulating (I)NGOs, but lacks both the cap-
acity and resources to effectively monitor the (I)NGOs.
From our interviews, we found that this office is under-
resourced and not able to supervise the NGOs active in
the district.
Similarly, the DHMT is supposed to oversee the District
Hospital, but the latter is a relatively autonomous actor,
being the largest health facility in the district, summoning
the largest budget and the largest workforce.
Appraisal of public accountability practices
To appraise the public accountability practices of the
key actors, we identified their practices and categorised
them in the social, political, organisational or provider
dimension (See Additional files 1 and 2 for a description
of the dimensions and the scoring system).
The DHMT obtained a score of 1 on the social dimen-
sion because it does not involve the CHPS committees
as a public accountability practice, nor are equity indica-
tors used in priority setting. It scores 3 on the political
dimension as the DHMT presents its planning and
budget to the District Assembly and keeps the District
Assembly regularly informed. On the organisational di-
mension, the score is 2: stakeholders such as the INGOs
and the DA are invited to the performance reviews of
the DHMT, but community representatives are not in-
vited. It scores 2 on the provider dimension since the
District Hospital has a formal procedure to manage
complaints and community representatives are included
in hospital peer reviews. However, the DHMT has no
specific measures to strengthen providers’ public ac-
countability practices in the first-line health facilities
(Fig. 5).
On the social dimension, INGO 1 obtains has a score
of 1 because it has no specific strategy to reach vulner-
able adolescents and women. It scores 3 on the political
dimension, because of the involvement of a political rep-
resentative in the Board. The INGO scores 2 on the or-
ganisational dimension as the Board does not include a
direct representative of the communities, the members
nor the peer educators, which is surprising for a mem-
bership organisation. The INGO has a score of 2 on the
provider dimension: patients are informed of their rights
and can make suggestions to improve service delivery
(Fig. 6).
INGO 2, a community-based INGO, specifically targets
vulnerable groups. The INGO tries to ensure that its activ-
ities reach vulnerable groups through sensitization of
communities and close monitoring, through which it eval-
uates whether the needs of vulnerable groups are met.
There are group discussions held with different groups in
the community. As a result, INGO 2 has a score of 2 on
the social dimension. The INGO has a score of 3 on the
political dimension, since political representatives are
involved in decision-making, and 3 on the organisational
dimension. It does not operate in the provider dimension
(Fig. 7).
Partnership 2 scores 2 on the social dimension: it does
not provide any channel for feedback to vulnerable
groups. The partnership has a score of 3 on the political
dimension and 3 on the organisational dimension (Fig. 8).
Both the District Assembly and the Ghana Health Ser-
vice are partners in the intervention and are part of the
programme committee where they can influence decisions
on activities to some extent. There is, however, no
representation of community members in the programme
committee.
The above analysis shows that most actors have public
accountability practices that cover the dimensions that
matter for their type of organisation (good ‘coverage’).
However, the actual public accountability practices they
develop within these dimensions are generally weak (low
‘intensity’). In general, political representatives (the Dis-
trict Assembly) and other stakeholders are involved in
decision-making processes, but there is no direct in-
volvement of the communities in the decision-making
processes of INGO 1, INGO 2 and Partnership 2. The
same goes for the District Health Management Team.
For instance, the CHPS committees are not used to en-
sure public accountability.
We found that the public actively demands accounts
of the providers and service managers and that it finds
new channels to express concerns regarding health ser-
vice delivery. The public airs complaints on the radio
and calls the District Health Management Team in case
there is a problem. Litigation related to health care ap-
pears to be also an emerging phenomenon (Employee
GHS, interview 65). However, this demand of the public
is not really being recognised by the key actors in the
district, who prioritise accountability towards the hier-
archy or to donors.
Discussion
In this rural health district with few (I)NGOs and private
sector providers, vertical, horizontal and partnership ac-
countability linkages are stronger than the actors’ public
accountability practices, even when the public contrib-
utes to health service provision, as is the case in Partner-
ship 2. Accountability practices embedded in vertical
governance arrangements were found to be strong.
However, community representatives are not directly in-
volved in any decision-making processes of the DHMT.
The CHPS committees are not functioning as a public
accountability instrument. In general, there are few
channels through which citizens, communities or health
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service users can exert a direct influence on decision-
making.
It is clear that some variability between the (I)NGOs is
due to their organisational profile. For instance, service
delivery INGOs are likely to have relatively stronger ac-
countability processes in the provider dimension, while
community-based INGOs can be expected to have
strong practices in the political and organisational di-
mension. Our findings seem to confirm the theories of
Edwards and Hulme, who found INGOs to balance mul-
tiple accountability streams, with accountability towards
communities losing out against demands from other
stakeholders [41].
The partnerships in this district have few public ac-
countability practices. This confirms the view of Esmark,
who contends that accountability within partnerships
tends to overshadow accountability to actors outside of
partnerships [42].
Our findings indicate that within the DHMT’s pro-
cesses, there are no structural arrangements for public
involvement in decision-making. The district health
committees attached to the DHMT, foreseen in the
Ghana Health Service and Teaching Hospitals Act of
1996 [13], appear not to be functioning in this district.
The fact that the health sub-committee under the Dis-
trict Assembly, set up after the introduction of the
decentralisation policy, overlaps in function and respon-
sibilities with the district health committees [36] is not
helpful. The potential of the CHPS committees to ensure
accountability is not exploited. It could be argued that
these were not intended as a public accountability in-
strument [43], but the committees are ideally placed at
the interface between communities and DHMT to play
such a role.
In this district, we identified accountability practices
that are based on the mechanism of persuasion, and
that are embedded in horizontal governance arrange-
ments. Our findings corroborate the theories of
Sorensen and Torfing [30] and Mulgan [44] on the
existence of horizontal accountability arrangements or
“networks” of accountability [27]. Such horizontal ac-
countability practices can be formal or informal [45,
46]. Examples of informal horizontal accountability
can be seen in this district: there is a high level of
trust between governing actors, grounded in intense
interaction between a small number of actors. In such
situations, there are likely to be more “informal ac-
countability” practices [47, 48]. It appears that from
the dense social fabric of this rural district, “spontan-
eous accountability” emerges between actors who are
connected through both professional and other rela-
tionships [49]. Intense interaction might generate
Fig. 5 Appraising the public accountability of the District Health Management Team
Fig. 6 Appraising the public accountability of INGO 1
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trust and vice versa, in situations of high trust, ac-
countability will spontaneously emerge. In situations
of low trust, formal regulation based on compliance
is required [50, 51]. Nevertheless, our findings dem-
onstrate that informal accountability practices in se
do not provide a guarantee for public accountability.
This case study has some limitations. We encountered
issues in relation to gatekeeping in organisational set-
tings as described by Burnham [52]. Some respondents
of INGO headquarters and some civil servants clearly
presented the official line of the organisation, not how
the organisation actually functioned. It was at times also
challenging to obtain reports from the different levels
within the GHS. Some of the selection of interviewees
was done on the basis of snowballing, whereby already
identified candidates were asked for other interesting in-
terviewees. This might have induced sample bias, but we
attempted to minimise this by comparing the candidates
proposed by the different respondents. Care was taken
to interview respondents of different categories, identi-
fied as relevant for this study.
We agree with Fontana and Frey that both the inter-
view and the interpretation of the event is socially con-
structed and contextual, influenced by the perceptions
of both the interviewer and interviewee [53]. As dis-
cussed above, respondent bias may have occurred in this
study and interviewees may have provided convenience
answers. When this appeared to be the case, we probed
with additional questions, drawing on documents and
other interviews. In such cases, we compared different
interviewees’ points of view (data triangulation).
Conclusions
In this case study, we identified the key actors in public
accountability in the field of health, identified their gov-
ernance arrangements and the accountability practices,
and mapped the accountability relationships. We found
that the accountability towards the public was woefully
underdeveloped. This study confirms that in settings
where there is a small number of actors involved in
organising health care, and where the state actors are
underfunded, the intense interaction leads to a web of
relations that favours horizontal accountability but fails
public accountability. It is clear that new formal chan-
nels need to be created by the GHS or the INGOs to ad-
dress the demand of the public for accountability. If the
public does not find an adequate response to its genuine
concerns, distrust between communities and service
users on one hand, and providers, INGOs and DHMT
on the other is likely to increase to the detriment of all
parties’ interests.
Fig. 7 Appraising the public accountability of INGO 2
Fig. 8 Appraising the public accountability of Partnership 2
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Endnotes
1Rondinelli DA, McCullough, J.S., Johnson, R.W., :
Analysing Decentralization Policies in Developing
Countries: A Political-Economy Framework. Develop-
ment and Change 1989, 20(1):57–87. distinguishes be-
tween four types of decentralisation arrangements.
‘Privatisation’ entails the transfer of responsibility for the
delivery of public goods and services to the private or
private-not-for-profit sector; ‘delegation’ means the
shifting of responsibility to parastatal organisations or
semi-autonomous agencies; with ‘devolution’, the respon-
sibility goes to local government or to the local adminis-
tration; and in a setting marked by ‘deconcentration’,
public goods are to be delivered by a central government
agent operating at the local level.
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Additional file 1: Interview guides: interview guides for in-depth
interviews. (DOCX 133 kb)
Additional file 2: Dimensions of accountability. (DOCX 79 kb)
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